It should also be noted that the conclusion that a provision is applied to the right of deduction may very well be an action directly relating to the same act which the court is entitled to perform if it is to apply that provision pragmatically. This is what we see in the example just given. The provision justifying (without conflicting considerations) the court`s decision to allow a police officer to question someone is itself a provision on court decisions to allow police officers to question someone. (In Holland, on the other hand, the provision applied concerned clauses limiting liability in contracts of carriage and not the rejection of certain remedies.) However, in such cases, a distinction must be made between the finding of the subsequent application of this provision in a particular situation (e.g., “This court is free to authorize a police officer to question that person”) and the statement in support of that conclusion (“It is not that this court should not legally empower a police officer to question that person”). The condition “If section 35(1) of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 is applicable to the situation at issue, then it is not true that this court should not allow a police officer to question that person” is not a tautology. As you can imagine, consistent law enforcement wasn`t all Denning did in The Hollandia. If Denning had merely argued and concluded that the bill of lading clause was null and void – if that had been all he would have done – he would have been properly accused of failing to apply the law to the case before him. 1. John 2:3–5 – “By this we know we have come to know Him if we keep His commandments. He who says, “I have known him” and does not keep his commandments is a liar, and the truth is not in him; but whoever keeps his word, in him the love of God has truly been perfected. By this, we know that we are in Him.
But it is true that if you actually marry, you will not perform any other act of law enforcement; They are simply exercising legal power and exercising the freedom that implies. Footnote 11 Similarly, by the inferential application of a provision, I can conclude that I am legally bound to pay you a certain amount of money; But by paying you, I do not “apply” the law: I am only doing my duty. This is what we see in The Hollandia. Denning clearly considered that admitting the appeal was the act that the court should lawfully perform; and it took that view on the basis that there was a particular provision – article III, paragraph 8, of the Hague-Visby Rules – which applied with some consistency to the specific clause in the bill of lading. Thus, it considered that the decision of the General Court was legally justified by reference to that provision; He made the provision in order to normatively support the tribunal`s action to admit the appeal – to justify it normatively, so to speak. Our discussion raised four main aspects of enforcement in the sense in which we discussed them – a meaning I would call inferential enforcement. First, applying the law consistently means arguing in a certain way. Second, it is about drawing a conclusion about object x – any object. Third, it bases that conclusion on the fact that a particular provision p is applicable to x with some consequence.
And fourth, the conclusion is legally considered true. A second set of questions concerns the indirect purpose of enforcement. The courts do not just apply the law; You apply it to something. Why exactly? Cases? By the way? To the “facts of the case”, as the common expression goes? We also say that a court applies the law in a particular case; and when it comes to deciding a particular case. Are they all the same? And what exactly does it mean to apply the law to a case? In fact, what is a “case”? This must itself be understood as the assertion that the fact that a clause is a third party clause in a bill of lading does not mean that that provision is not applicable to it. I have deferred consideration of the indirect purpose and content issues because, as I have explained, they may receive different responses depending on the type of enforcement we have in mind. What I have just said in section V on the concept of case shows that this is true for the indirect purpose of the application of the law. The indirect object of the inferential application of the law is a “case” only in that first empty sense of the word. As we have seen in section II.E, this is any subject matter x such that the applicability of part of the existing law to x depends on whether a particular statement concerning x is legally true. That is what a court will apply the law to in an inferential manner. Pragmatic application of the law, on the other hand, is the application, not but in a case or in the decision of a case – but in a different sense from “case”.
As far as the content of any form of application of the law is concerned, this is exactly what the definitions I propose claim to characterise. 1. Make a formal request or petition, usually in writing, to a court, officer, director or corporation to grant a favour, rule or order that is within its power or discretion. For example, to apply for an injunction, a pardon, an insurance policy. 2. Use or use for a particular purpose: to appropriate and dedicate oneself to a particular use, object, claim or object. Thus, payments must be applied to the reduction of the interest rate. 3. Define, use or reference as appropriate or relative; coordinate the language with a specific topic; the application of the wording of a statute to a particular situation. The application of Article 54 § 2 to the applicant`s complaint by the Labour Court justified the conclusion that Article 54 § 1 was not applicable to the complaint. Thus, the reasoning of this court for this conclusion could be reconstructed: both this definition and the definition of the pragmatic application of the law (which will be proposed shortly in section III.A) are intended to be analyses of the concepts to be defined.
In the discussion so far, an attempt has been made to identify the characteristics that we, as competent users of these two concepts (although of course not under the names invented here for everyone) assume both ways of applying the law – and now, if we think about it, can recognize. The following section does the same for pragmatic enforcement of the law. The proposed definitions aim to crystallize these characteristics in a concise formulation. Applying p to x means clarifying both of these things. It is a reasoned opinion on a particular consequence (or consequences) that p has legally for x. I don`t think so. “Declaration of Law” is an ambiguous term. It is sometimes used to refer to so-called “normative” or “deontic” statements: statements about normative positions (duties, freedoms, powers, etc.) that we have under applicable law. Courts often challenge such statements – statements such as “The defendant was obliged to provide services to the plaintiff” – applying the applicable law. But the range of conclusions that can be drawn and justified in this way is not limited to normative position statements (Denning`s conclusion in The Hollandia that Term 2 is “null and void” in this particular bill of lading is not in itself a deontic statement, at least not obviously), and there is therefore no fundamental limitation on the scope of the objects. to which existing law can potentially be applied (conceptually).
As I mentioned in Section I, it is often said that the courts apply the law in both cases and cases. So far, I have tried to avoid the language of “cases”, and I have almost always succeeded. But the definitions I proposed would do better to be at least compatible with it. Are they? Three sets of questions arise simultaneously. One is what I would call the direct purpose of enforcement. When a court applies the law, what exactly does it apply? This is not a trick question. It is said that courts “apply” all sorts of things: laws, rules, principles, guidelines, doctrines, views of other courts, and more. Is “the law” the name of another item on this list? This rings false. Or are the courts enforcing the law by applying some or some of these points? And if so, can we give a principle test for what is on the list? And the same goes for judges everywhere. In determining whether a provision is applicable in this case, courts do not provide exhaustive descriptions of the characteristics that a case to which the provision applies should satisfy. They cannot even reasonably be expected to provide watertight descriptions of the relevant features of the present case.
They do not articulate and do not engage, unlike Denning, in statements of `rules` of the first order, which they express with the relevant provision and by virtue of which they then merely encompass the present case. Premise (4) is decisive. It should be noted that what is alleged in premiss (3) – which describes the outcome of the subsequent application of the provision to the clause – is considered by the court to be grounds for a particular course of action.